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More than a month has passed since the conclusion of the high-level conference on the 
future of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held at Brighton, England—the 
third such gathering devoted to overhauling the Strasbourg supervisory system in 
response to the crushing backlog of pending applications and the structural human 
rights problems that are their root cause.  Unlike the conferences in Interlaken and 
Izmir, however, the delegates in Brighton gathered under a cloud of vociferous protests 
against the Court by the public and government officials in the United Kingdom.  
According to a 2011 poll, a majority of voters believe that the UK government should 
withdraw from the European Convention on Human Rights—a view likely stoked by 
incendiary statements such as Prime Minister David Cameron’s exclamation that 
implementing an ECtHR judgment recognizing prisoners’ right to vote “makes me feel 
sick.”   
 
A pervasive air of backlash against the Court suffused the lead up to the Brighton 
Conference.  Whereas previous reform proposals stressed the need to strengthen the 
regional human rights system, ECtHR watchers were shocked that a draft of the 
Brighton Declaration—leaked to the public in late February 2012—contained a blueprint 
for clipping the Strasbourg Court’s wings and weakening supranational review of 
member states’ human rights practices.  The final text is anodyne in comparison, and 
most observers are breathing a collective sigh of relief that the outcome of the 
conference was not as bad as they had initially feared.   
 
The Brighton Declaration is, however, a watershed—or, perhaps more accurately, a low 
water mark—in at least one important respect.  It directs the Committee of Ministers to 
prepare the text of a new Protocol to the Convention.  If approved, the Protocol will be 
the first amendment in the nearly sixty-year history of the Council of Europe’s human 
rights system to include provisions that restrict rather than enhance the authority and 
discretion of ECtHR judges.  
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In this brief commentary, I first review the Brighton Declaration provisions that reflect the 
member states’ attempt to rein in the power of Strasbourg judges.  I then introduce and 
defend a proposal to condition access to the new Protocol’s “benefits” to those member 
states that are adequately shouldering the “burdens” of more deeply embedding the 
Convention and ECtHR case law in their national legal orders.  I conclude by identifying 
alternative ways to implement this proposal and discuss their potential benefits and 
drawbacks. 
 
*  *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
The Brighton Declaration is divided into seven substantive sections.  Three sections—
implementation of the Convention at national level; processing of applications; and 
execution of judgments of the Court—correspond to what the Council of Europe has 
labeled the upstream, midstream, and downstream causes of the ECtHR’s docket crisis.  
The remaining four sections address the interaction between the Court and national 
authorities; applications to the Court; judges and jurisprudence of the Court; and the 
longer-term future of the Convention system.  The proposals to amend the Convention 
to restrict the ECtHR’s authority appear in these latter provisions.  They include: 
 
 adding to the Convention’s preamble express references to the principle of 
subsidiarity and to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation—references that many 
observers view as a signal to the ECtHR to give greater deference to member states 
(¶12.b);  
 eliminating, from the “significant disadvantage” ground for declaring an application 
inadmissible, the safeguard clause that permits the ECtHR to review the application 
if it “has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal” (¶15.c);  
 removing the parties’ ability to object to a Chamber’s decision to relinquish a case to 
the Grand Chamber, a venue viewed as more sympathetic to national governments 
(¶25.d). 
 
Supplementing these “hard law” provisions are several nonbinding statements that, with 
varying degrees of subtly, suggest that the ECtHR should rein in its scrutiny of national 
governments: 
 
 an assertion that “the role of the Court is to review whether decisions taken by 
national authorities are compatible with the Convention, having due regard to the 
State’s margin of appreciation” (¶11); 
 a recommendation that the ECtHR “take a strict and consistent approach” to 
declaring inadmissible complaints that have “been duly considered by a domestic 
court applying the rights guaranteed by the Convention in light of well-established 
case law of the Court including on the margin of appreciation” (¶15.d);  
 an invitation to the Court “to have regard to the importance of consistency where 
judgments relate to aspects of the same issue, so as to ensure their cumulative 
effect continues to afford States Parties an appropriate margin of appreciation” 
(¶25.c); and 
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 a timetable for the Committee of Ministers to determine whether existing reforms 
have “proven to be sufficient to assure sustainable functioning” of the ECtHR, or 
whether “more profound changes are necessary” (¶34). 
 
To be fair, the Brighton Declaration also reaffirms member states’ “deep and abiding 
commitment” to the Convention, its institutions, and the right of individual petition (¶¶1-
2).  In addition, member states recognize their responsibility to ensure the effective 
domestic implementation of the Convention and to abide by ECtHR judgments against 
them (¶¶3-4).  The opening paragraph of the section on “implementation of the 
Convention at national level” makes this point succinctly and forcefully: 
 
All laws and policies should be formulated, and all State officials should 
discharge their responsibilities, in a way that gives full effect to the 
Convention.  States Parties must also provide means by which remedies 
may be sought for alleged violations of the Convention.  National courts 
and tribunals should take into account the Convention and the case law of 
the Court (¶7). 
 
The Declaration then lists the “specific measures” to achieve the objectives in this 
paragraph.  These measures include establishing independent national human rights 
institutions; authorizing parliaments to review the Convention-compatibility of draft 
legislation; introducing new legal remedies; encouraging courts to take the Convention 
and ECtHR case law into account; facilitating litigants’ ability to raise Convention 
violations; and training and informing officials at all levels of government about the 
Convention’s requirements (¶9.c).   
 
It bears emphasizing, however, that these commitment to domestic implementation are 
couched in hortatory, aspirational language.  States “should” take these steps.  They will 
“consider” these measures “so far as relevant” and will “encourage” their adoption (¶¶7, 
9.c).  None of these pledges will be part of the new Protocol that the Declaration 
contemplates.  This creates a structural imbalance in the proposal to amend the 
Convention.  A binding international instrument will give member states the “benefits” of 
the Brighton Declaration—dismissal of more applications and more deferential review of 
those considered on the merits—without a corresponding obligation to shoulder the 
“burdens” of fully implementing the Convention and ECtHR jurisprudence in national 
legal systems. 
 
*  *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
To forestall this imbalance, I propose that the envisaged new Protocol require member 
states to embed the Convention and ECtHR case law more firmly in their respective 
domestic legal orders.  Such a proposal is—with the notable exception of the recent 
backlash against the Strasbourg Court in the UK—the next logical step in a decades-
long evolution of the European human rights system.   
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Over the last quarter century, a growing number of countries have incorporated the 
Convention into domestic law.  As the Strasbourg system matured, the percentage of 
incorporating countries increased such that by 2004 the treaty had “become an integral 
part of the domestic legal orders of all states parties.”  A more rapid shift has occurred 
with respect to the ability of national courts to reopen judicial proceedings following 
adverse ECtHR judgments.  In 2000, the Committee of Ministers launched a campaign 
urging governments to authorize this remedy.  By 2006, reopened proceedings were 
available in criminal cases in 80% of member states, and in civil and administrative 
cases in approximately half of those states.  Procedures to verify the Convention-
compatibility of draft legislation and administrative regulations are another area of rapid 
progress encouraged by the Committee of Ministers.  Such procedures now exist in 
various forms in all member countries.   
 
The domestic implementation clauses of the Brighton Declaration, summarized above, 
reinforce these efforts.  Taken together, these recommendations—and governments’ 
generally favorable responses to them—create an acquis of best practices for how to 
more firmly embed the Convention and ECtHR judgments in national legal orders.  The 
ultimate goal of this process, as I have previously argued, is for national decision-
makers to acquire the authority and capacity to serve as first-line defenders and 
remediators of human rights violations in Europe, with the ECtHR serving as a backstop 
where national actors fail to carry out these functions. 
 
Although member states have made significant strides toward this goal over the last 
decade, the progress has been uneven.  This is especially true for the endemic 
structural human rights problems in a handful of countries that generate numerous 
applications to Strasbourg.  Well-known examples include excessively lengthy judicial 
proceedings in Italy; executive meddling in final court judgments in the Ukraine; 
disappearances in the Kurdish regions of Turkey; and discrimination against Roma 
communities in several Eastern European countries.  The result is marked and growing 
geographic imbalance in the ECtHR’s case load.  At the end of 2011, just five of 47 
member states—Italy, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine—accounted for more 
than 61% of all applications to the Court, with Russia alone the source of more than 
26% of all complaints.  Adding the next five states increased the proportion to 78%.  
The reason for these disparities, as Helen Keller and her coauthors explain in an 
insightful 2011 journal article, is that “the systems of judicial relief in these countries are 
particularly problematic . . . owing to structural problems affecting the efficiency of the 
judicial work or to deficiencies concerning respect for the principle of the rule of law.” 
 
The disproportionate percentage of applications from this small group of countries 
highlights the need to disaggregate proposals for greater subsidiarity and a wider 
margin of appreciation from “the principle of equal treatment of all States Parties,” which 
the Brighton Declaration reaffirms (¶20.c).  Nonbinding pledges to improve domestic 
implementation of the Convention and to speed compliance with ECtHR judgments—
and the financial and technical assistance from the Council of Europe that facilitate 
them—are well and good.  But they are no longer sufficient.  If a new treaty is required 
to meet the crisis that the Strasbourg system now faces, that instrument should include 
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specific and binding commitments to more securely anchor the Convention and ECtHR 
judgments in national legal orders.  In addition, and more crucially, the Protocol should 
make compliance with those commitments a condition of applying the narrower 
admissibility rules and more deferential judicial review standards that the Brighton 
Declaration contemplates. 
 
*  *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
Although my proposal to reform the ECtHR will likely be controversial, there are several 
reasons to think that it may be politically feasible.  First, the acquis of best practices on 
embeddedness that has built up over the last decade has strong support from the 
member states, acting on their own and through recommendations of the Council of 
Europe adopted by consensus.  Second, the three recent high-level conferences on the 
ECtHR’s future have reaffirmed the basic elements of the acquis that would comprise 
the Protocol’s “burdens.”  Third, the amendment could be structured to give states a 
modicum of flexibility regarding embeddedness.  For example, it could include a phase-
in clause to give governments additional time to adjust their laws and practices, or.  Or it 
could allow states to accept different packages of commitments, an approach used by 
the European Social Charter.  Such a procedure would be especially useful for states 
that oppose specific implementation measures, such as reopening judgments in civil 
cases.  Finally, the Protocol would not single out countries based on how many 
applications are pending against them, either in absolute or relative terms.  Rather, it 
would provide a template to assess whether any ratifying state had adopted the 
implementation measures that the amendment requires.   
 
Assuming that the political will exists for such a proposal, how might it be implemented?  
An important initial issue relates to the new Protocol’s entry-into-force rules.  Previous 
systemic overhauls of the European human rights system—such as Protocol No. 11, 
which established a permanent Court, and Protocol No. 14, which authorized single 
judges and three-judge committees to dismiss inadmissible applications—have required 
ratification by all member states.  More modest reforms, such as Protocol No. 9, which 
gave private litigants a right to appeal to the ECtHR the reports of the erstwhile 
European Commission, could be adopted on a country by country basis.  The new 
amendment falls somewhere in between these two extremes. 
 
If the drafters choose an opt-in approach, each member of the Council of Europe would 
confront a “package deal” treaty that includes both the burdens and the benefits of the 
Brighton Declaration.  A state could eschew this deal altogether.  Such a country would 
continue to be governed by existing admissibility rules and supranational review 
standards.  But it would avoid the Protocol’s hard law obligation to implement the 
Convention domestically.  (The nonbinding recommendations of the high-level 
conferences would retain their persuasive authority.)  Conversely, a state that ratified 
the Protocol would be subject to its narrower admissibility requirements and more 
deferential review standards.  It would, however, also undertake a binding commitment 
to embed the Convention and ECtHR judgments in national law.   
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An opt-in Protocol must also include a mechanism to ensure that ratifying states adhere 
to this bargain.  If the Protocol’s embeddedness obligations will be effective 
immediately, the drafters could create a preclearance procedure by which a new or 
existing Council of Europe body would determine whether a state has implemented the 
necessary measures.  A green light from that body would be a prerequisite to 
ratification.  As an alternative or in addition, the drafters could establish a mechanism to 
review compliance after ratification.  Such a mechanism might be designed in a variety 
of ways.  States could submit periodic reports to a Council of Europe body to 
demonstrate their compliance.  Or the ECtHR could make such an assessment, either 
on its own authority or in response to a complaint by a private litigant or another state.  
Finally, the Protocol would also need a suspension clause to identify the conditions 
under which a country that falls out of compliance with its embeddedness obligations 
would lose some or all of the benefits of the amendment’s more sovereignty-friendly 
admissibility rules and review standards. 
 
One possible downside of an opt-in approach is that it would not do enough to reduce 
the ECtHR’s backlog of cases.  This might occur if several of the ten member states that 
generate most applications to the Court decided not to ratify the amendment.  In that 
event, the Protocol might curb the number of politically controversial judgments that the 
ECtHR issues against states with comparatively good records of protecting civil and 
political liberties, but have limited impact in reducing complaints from countries with 
enduring, structural human rights problems. 
 
How might the process differ if all 47 member states were required to ratify the Protocol 
to bring it into force?  In that event, countries in which the Convention or ECtHR 
judgments are less deeply embedded may seek to water down the Protocol’s 
implementation rules or the mechanisms for reviewing compliance with them.  The 
result is likely to be a weaker legal instrument than would be agreed to under an opt-in 
scenario.  In addition, the prospect of region-wide ratification would likely require more 
extensive negotiations, postponing the adoption of the final text.  A further delay of 
several years would follow as each country proceeded through its domestic ratification 
process.  Once the amendment was in force, however, it would avoid the potential 
legitimacy concerns raised by applying different admissibility rules and judicial review 
standards to different member states.  There would also be modest efficiency gains for 
ECtHR judges and Registry lawyers from applying a uniform set of procedures.   
 
Whichever design strategy is adopted, what is essential is to link the burdens and 
benefits of Brighton in a single legal instrument.  Doing so would create a positive 
incentive for member states to bolster national systems of human rights protection and, 
ultimately, to take primary responsibility for preventing and remedying the vast majority 
of violations of civil and political liberties.  The judges in Strasbourg could then 
concentrate their considerable legal talents on monitoring the proper functioning of 
those national systems, stepping into the breach where those systems falter, and 
ensuring that the Convention remains a living instrument that responds to evolving 
regional and global understandings of human rights.   
 
